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INTRODUCTION
Should employers be able to require individual employees to sign 
away their rights to collective action as a condition of employment?  
Certainly, employees should wonder just what they are giving up when 
they sign dispute resolution “agreements”1 in order to get a job.  These 
employer-mandated contract provisions generally require the exclusive use 
of individual arbitration for future employment disputes, preventing access 
to group action in court or arbitration.  In many instances, employees are 
also barred from seeking relief from administrative agencies that protect 
the rights of workers such as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).  
Does the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2—a federal labor law that 
guarantees the right of employees to act in concert for mutual aid or 
protection—permit such waivers, or must the Federal Arbitration Act 
* Professor of Business Law, Carroll School of Management, Boston College.  The author 
wishes to thank Professors Stephanie Greene and Margo E. K. Reder of Boston College for 
their helpful ideas on this paper.
 1.  Arguably the word “agreement” is a misnomer because the “agreement” to the 
provision is generally a requirement in order for the employee to obtain employment.  Thus, 
it is an adhesive contract provision that is unfavorable to the employee and not made a 
subject for negotiation.  Individual arbitration as the exclusive remedy is literally stuck onto 
the hiring deal, which the employee only “agrees” to in order to obtain employment.  Thus, 
this “agreement” is a “take it or leave it” matter—although, in some instances, employers 
allow a brief period to opt out of the dispute resolution program (DRP) that is otherwise the 
default.  The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has taken the position that an 
opportunity to opt out does not save individual DRPs from violating the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), but some courts have been inclined to look more favorably at opt-
out provisions. Compare On Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *4, 
6 (Aug. 27, 2015) (finding the opt-out provisions interfere with Section 7 rights and are 
contrary to federal labor law policy), rev’d summarily per curiam, No. 15-60642, 2016 WL 
3685206 (5th Cir. June 6, 2016) with Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 
1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the plaintiff’s decision to enter into an arbitration 
agreement did not amount to an unfair labor practice).  The Ninth Circuit upheld a DRP 
agreement requiring arbitration and prohibiting joinder of claims because an employee had 
the right to opt out of the DRP, which she did not exercise, and thereafter could not claim 
that enforcement of DRP violates Norris-LaGuardia or the NLRA. Johnmohammadi, 755 
F.3d at 1077.  Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the DRP must be enforced 
according to its terms.  Thus, had she opted out, she would have been free to pursue this 
class action in court. Id.  In Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 982 n.4 (9th Cir. 
2016), cert. granted, No. 16-300, 2017 WL 125665 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017), the Ninth Circuit 
noted that pursuant to its ruling in Johnmohammadi, there would be no Section 8 violation if 
“the employee . . . could have opted out of the individual dispute resolution agreement and 
chose not to.” 
 2.  29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).  In particular, this paper and the courts look at 29 
U.S.C. § 157. 
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(FAA)3—a federal law that favors arbitration as a dispute resolution 
mechanism—take precedence over the NLRA?  If an employer provides 
the option to “opt out” on the waiver of collective rights, will this option 
save such provisions from being a mandatory condition of employment and 
hence be unlawful under the NLRA? 
The NLRB has answered the foregoing questions with a resounding 
“no.”  The agency’s rulings on mandatory class or collective action4
waivers rely upon the fact that the right to collective action is protected 
concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA, a substantive right that 
cannot be individually and prospectively waived.5  In addition, it is clear 
that the freedom to file charges at the NLRB, either individually or 
collectively, and the right to sue in court are also protected activities under 
Section 7.6
In both D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil, the NLRB held that employers 
violate the NLRA when they require employees to waive their right to 
 3.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012). 
 4.  See Nicole Wredberg, Subverting Worker Rights: Class Action Waivers and the 
Arbitral Threat to the NLRA, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 884-85 (2016) (differentiating between 
collective actions where individuals must affirmatively give consent before becoming part 
of the class and class actions where all similarly situated employees are automatically 
included).
 5.  See Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at *1-2, *8-10 (Oct. 28, 2014) 
(indicating that national labor policy supports a right to engage in collective action), 
enforcement denied in relevant part, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied,
No. 14-608000 (5th Cir. May 13, 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-307, 2017 WL 125666 (U.S. 
Jan. 13, 2017); On Assignment Staffing Servs., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *5-8 (determining 
that opt-out does not save an otherwise invalid mandatory arbitration provision that requires 
individual employees to give up statutory right to act concertedly).  The NLRB, in both 
Murphy Oil and On Assignment, cited this author’s co-authored article on the issue of 
collective action waivers in mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions in employment 
agreements. Murphy Oil, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at *2 n.15 (citing Stephanie Greene & 
Christine Neylon O’Brien, The NLRB v. The Courts: Showdown over the Right to Collective 
Action in Workplace Disputes, 52 AM. BUS. L. J. 75 (2015)); On Assignment, 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 189, at *8 n.28 & at *9 n.32 (citing Greene & O’Brien, supra, at 119-21).  In On
Assignment, the majority of the Board panel cited our discussion regarding opt-out 
provisions, particularly how they require affirmative action on the part of the employee in 
order to preserve statutory rights. Id. at *8 n.28.  In addition, the Board quoted our analysis 
that the courts have not “given serious consideration to the merits of the Board’s analysis 
and the fact that the case raises issues that have not been addressed by the Supreme Court.”  
Id. at *9 n.32.  Member Johnson’s dissent took issue with our interpretation of opt-outs, 
arguing that “a requirement of affirmative action to preserve rights is not alien to our system 
of law, including labor law.”  Id. at *15 n.34 (Johnson, M., dissenting).  It should be noted 
that, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, employees may collectively agree to 
dispute resolution agreements that waive collective and class actions.  
 6.  See Eastex, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978) (holding 
that Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ efforts to improve working conditions 
through administrative and judicial forums). 
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“joint, class, or collective claims addressing wages, hours, or other working 
conditions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial” as a 
condition of employment.7  The NLRB found that requiring individual 
employees to sign such agreements, as opposed to a union agreeing to 
resolve disputes through arbitration in a collective bargaining agreement, 
amounted to an unfair labor practice.8  The restraints on collective action 
work against the policies and purposes of the NLRA, which policies and 
purposes include fostering concerted activity in order to equalize the 
bargaining power of employees against the superior strength of the 
employer.9
As large, well-established corporate entities crafted increasingly 
expansive arbitration provisions foreclosing access to judicial tribunals and 
restricting joinder of claims, provisions that restrict individuals’ rights to 
engage in collective activity and class actions, the Supreme Court has 
reflexively upheld such provisions based upon its interpretation of the 
FAA’s supremacy.10  The Supreme Court has upheld arbitration clauses for 
consumer, merchant credit, and employment matters without concern for 
the Constitutional right to a judicial forum,11 or for the deleterious effect on 
other federal laws regarding securities, antitrust, employment, and 
consumer protection.12  To date, the NLRB has been, in a sense, like the 
canary in the coal mine on this mandatory arbitration issue, consistently 
messaging that individual arbitration, imposed as a condition of 
employment, violates employees’ federal statutory rights to engage in 
collective action.13
 7.  See Murphy Oil, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at *1 (quoting D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 
N.L.R.B. 2277, 2277 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), 
reh’g en banc denied, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2014)). 
 8.  See D. R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2278-80 (holding that collective pursuit of a 
workplace grievance in arbitration is equally protected by the NLRA). 
 9.  Id. at 2279. 
 10.  See Greene & O’Brien, supra note 5, at 82-88 (analyzing Supreme Court decisions 
where the Court majority exhibited a preference for individual arbitration under the FAA). 
 11.  See Interview by Dave Davies with Jessica Silver-Greenberg, “Have We Lost a 
Constitutional Right in the Fine Print,” NPR: FRESH AIR (Nov. 12, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/11/12/455749456/have-we-lost-a-constitutional-right-in-the-fine-
print [https://perma.cc/57QY-BD32] (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) (elaborating upon the 
consequences of agreements that require arbitration and ban class actions lawsuits). 
 12.  See Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic: 
Mandatory arbitration deprives workers and consumers of their rights, ECON. POLICY INST.,
EPI BRIEFING PAPER NO. 414, 1, 10-14 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-
epidemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QPG-LBD3] (discussing these and other issues, including 
the effective vindication doctrine and California’s Private Attorney General Act). 
 13.  See Jessical Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Start-ups Embrace Arbitration 
to Settle Workplace Disputes, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2016), http://nyti.ms/20FZRzG 
[https://perma.cc/9WBB-K8VF] (noting that arbitration clauses directly oppose workplace 
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The right to collective action is truly the centerpiece of the NLRA, 
recognized as such because without it, employees lack bargaining power, 
mass, organization, and expertise for managing employment matters with 
their employers.  The right to engage in protected, concerted activity 
embodied in Section 7 of the NLRA created an employee bill of rights in 
the private sector workplace.14  Importantly, employees need not be in a 
union or forming a union in order to gain the protection of Section 7, 
rather, the right to engage in concerted activities for “mutual aid or 
protection” and the right to refrain from engaging in such activities are all 
clearly spelled out in the statute.  Section 7, with its protective umbrella for 
collective action, is the heart of the NLRA, and the NLRB has held that 
employers may not require individual employees to sign away this right to 
act together in order to secure employment, even where such waivers are 
cast as voluntary or “optional.”15  Subordinating the foundation of this 
federal labor statute to the FAA, without statutory directive or even 
legislative history supporting this intent, would decimate the very purpose 
of the labor law without providing a corresponding benefit under the FAA.  
Limiting arbitration to individual claims is not a central concern of the 
FAA, rather, it is the strategy of big business to limit its exposure to 
workplace dispute claims by unilaterally imposing such restrictive pre-
dispute contract terms as a condition of employment.16  Mandatory 
transparency); see also Jeff Hirsch, Silicon Valley Arbitration Clauses, WORKPLACE PROF
BLOG (May 14, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2016/05/silicon-
valley-arbitration-clauses.html [https://perma.cc/82GW-6PA6] (noting that the NLRB is the 
only agency taking action on behalf of employees relating to this arbitration issue and that 
“[w]orkers represented by experienced unions tend to fare well under arbitration systems, 
while individual employees—or those trying to form class actions—are far less likely to see 
the benefits of one-sided arbitration agreements”).
 14.  Section 7 provides: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the 
right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 15.  See Bristol Farms, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 45, at *2 (Nov. 25, 2015) (“It is a bedrock 
principle of federal labor law and policy that agreements in which individual employees 
purport to give up the statutory right to act concertedly for their mutual aid or protection are 
void.”); On Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *1 (Aug. 27, 2015) 
(holding opt-out provision did not render arbitration agreement that waived collective action 
lawful because it required employees to prospectively waive their Section 7 right to engage 
in concerted activity), rev’d summarily per curiam, No. 15-60642, 2016 WL 3685206 (5th 
Cir. June 6, 2016). 
 16.  See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking 
the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1KMvBJg 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 5 S
ide B
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 5 Side B      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
1_O'BRIEN_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:30 PM
520 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:3 
arbitration agreements that deny the right to pursue claims collectively 
unfairly enhance employers’ bargaining positions and accelerate the 
erosion of workers’ rights and statutory protections.17  With the passing of 
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, author of the majority’s 5-4 opinion in 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,18 the future is questionable regarding the 
Court’s potential endorsement of employment agreements that require 
waivers of collective or class actions and mandate individual arbitration—a  
topic on which the Supreme Court has yet to rule - that could gut the 
substance of the NLRA to achieve a goal that the FAA does not require.19
This research paper analyzes five recent cases on the issue of 
mandatory arbitration clauses that prohibit joinder of individual 
employment claims.  The first case, On Assignment, was one of first 
impression for the NLRB where the agency answered the question of 
whether providing an opportunity to opt out of a mandatory dispute 
resolution program with a class waiver saves the provision from violating 
the NLRA.20  The NLRB ruled that opt-out provisions do not validate such 
class waivers.21  The Fifth Circuit granted the employer’s motion for 
summary reversal of the Board’s order in On Assignment.22  This follows 
the Fifth Circuit’s pattern of refusing to enforce the NLRB’s other related 
decisions on mandatory pre-dispute individual arbitration provisions with 
collective action waivers in both D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil.23
The second case analyzed here, Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, is a 
[https://perma.cc/7SSH-AXD6] (noting “[s]ome state judges have called the class-action 
bans a ‘get out of jail free’ card, because it is nearly impossible for one individual to take on 
a corporation with vast resources,” and recalling that federal judge William G. Young stated 
in an interview that “business has a good chance of opting out of the legal system altogether 
and misbehaving without reproach”). 
 17.  See Stone & Colvin, supra note 12, at 21 (noting that plaintiff’s access to attorneys 
was limited in individual arbitration where collective contingent fee arrangements are not 
available and the data shows large gap in economic outcomes favoring employers in 
arbitration as compared to litigation). 
 18. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 19.  See Gordon Renneisen, The Post-Scalia Fate of Employment Class Waivers,
LAW360 (March 9, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/768875/the-post-scalia-fate-of-
employment-class-waivers [https://perma.cc/FZC9-PS74] (offering perspective on how the 
new Court will be called upon to re-examine the holding of Concepcion).
 20.  On Assignment Staffing Servs., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *1. 
 21.  Id.
 22.  On Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., No. 15-60642, 
2016 WL 3685206, at *1 (5th Cir. June 6, 2016) (per curiam). 
 23.  D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2277 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part,
737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2014); 
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at *1-2, *8-10 (Oct. 28, 2014), enforcement
denied in relevant part, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, No. 14-
608000 (5th Cir. May 13, 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-307, 2017 WL 125666 (U.S. Jan. 13, 
2017).
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federal district court decision from California upholding the NLRB’s 
position in a D. R. Horton-type24 case where there was no opt-out 
provision.25  The Totten case is presently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit 
where a potential affirmance would add to what has developed into a 
circuit split on this issue.26
The third case discussed, Lewis v. Epic Systems, is initially analyzed 
in light of the federal district court’s decision to follow the NLRB’s D. R. 
Horton rationale, and its previous decision in Herrington v. Waterstone 
Mortgage Corp.27  The Lewis case was appealed and argued before the 
Seventh Circuit where the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
employer’s motion to compel arbitration, creating a clear circuit split on the 
issue of pre-dispute arbitration provisions that waive the right to collective 
action.28  In contrast to the district court decisions in Totten and Lewis, as 
well as the Seventh Circuit’s affirmance in Lewis, cases from the Fifth 
Circuit have disagreed with the NLRB’s position in D. R. Horton and
Murphy Oil.29  Nonetheless, in a closely related matter, the Fifth Circuit 
 24.  See D. R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2278-80 (announcing principle that mandatory 
pre-dispute individual arbitration with waiver of all collective action violates the NLRA); 
see also Greene & O’Brien, supra note 5, at 88-111 (outlining the NLRB’s rationale in D. R. 
Horton and the deficiencies in cases where courts refused to enforce the NLRB on this 
issue); note, Deference and the Federal Arbitration Act: The NLRB’s Determination of 
Substantive Statutory Rights, 128 HARV. L. REV. 907, 908 n.11 (2015) (suggesting that 
courts should defer to the NLRB’s finding that concerted legal activity is a substantive right 
under Section 7 of the NLRA). 
 25.  Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1258 (C.D. Cal. 
2016), appeal filed, No. 16-55569 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2016). 
 26.  See Lawrence E. Dubé, Court Backs NLRB View on Class Action Waivers, DAILY
LAB. RPT. (BNA) No. 24, at A-10 (Feb. 5, 2016) (noting Ninth Circuit could create a circuit 
split if it affirmed the district court’s decision in Totten).
 27.  Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 15-CV-82-BBC, 2015 WL 5330300, at *2-3 (W.D. 
Wis. Sept. 11, 2015) (citing Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., 993 F. Supp. 2d 940, 
943-46 (W.D. Wis. 2014)), aff’d, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-285, 
2017 WL 125664 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017). 
 28.  Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-285, 
2017 WL 125664 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017); see also Vin Gurrieri, 7th Circ. Tees Up Class 
Waiver Battle for Supreme Court, LAW360 (May 27, 2016), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/801487/7th-circ-tees-up-class-waiver-battle-for-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/UVM2-FPQP] (noting Seventh Circuit’s decision to uphold the NLRB in 
Lewis may set the stage for a Supreme Court decision in light of Fifth Circuit’s contrary 
position).
 29.  See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.  The NLRB was unsuccessful in its 
request for an en banc rehearing and reversal of the Fifth Circuit’s panel decision in Murphy
Oil. See Lawrence E. Dubé, NLRB Seeks 5th Cir. Rehearing on Class Waivers, DAILY LAB.
RPT. (BNA) No. 74, at A-8 (Apr. 18, 2016) (noting NLRB’s argument that “just as an 
employer may not require that an employee waive her rights to earn a minimum wage or be 
free from age discrimination in the workplace, it may not require that she waive that core 
substantive NLRB right” embodied in Section 7, that is the right to engage in concerted 
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upheld the NLRB’s finding that a mandatory individual arbitration 
provision that a reasonable person could construe as barring the filing of 
NLRB charges was an unfair labor practice.30  This latter issue is one that 
the NLRB outlined as part of its holding in D. R. Horton,31 and it is an issue 
on which even the Fifth and Eighth Circuits agree.32  Thus, even though 
both of these courts have ruled against the NLRB on the primary collective 
action waiver issue, they deferred to the Board’s test regarding arbitration 
provisions that would lead a reasonable person to believe that they were 
barred from filing a claim at the NLRB. 
The fourth case analyzed in this paper was decided just a week after 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision to uphold the NLRB in Lewis but had a very 
different outcome.  The Eighth Circuit decided Cellular Sales of Missouri, 
LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd., following the reasoning of the Fifth 
Circuit and finding that a mobile phone salesman was bound by his 
agreement to resolve disputes solely by individual arbitration.33
activity for mutual aid or protection); Vin Gurrieri, NLRB Asks 5th Circ. To Rethink Class 
Waiver Ruling, LAW360 (April 19, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/785580/nlrb-
asks-5th-circ-to-rethink-class-waiver-ruling [https://perma.cc/5Y57-EDDY] (arguing for en 
banc review on basis the three-judge panel misread Supreme Court precedent which did not 
relate to the NLRA and the substantive rights embodied therein).  The Fifth Circuit declined 
to reconsider its October 2015 decision to reverse the NLRB’s ruling in Murphy Oil. See Y. 
Peter Kang, 5th Circ. Won’t Rethink NLRB Reversal in Class Waiver Row, LAW360 (May 
13, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/796378/5th-circ-won-t-rethink-nlrb-reversal-in-
class-waiver-row [https://perma.cc/5595-98ZF] (stating that the Fifth Circuit declined to 
reconsider Murphy Oil); Lawrence E. Dubé, 5th Cir. Won’t Rehear NLRB’s Murphy Oil 
Case on Class Waivers, DAILY LAB. RPT. (BNA) No. 94, at A-1 (May 16, 2016) (noting the 
justices denied the petition without comment and NLRB had until August 11, 2016, to 
petition the U.S. Supreme Court for review on ruling in Murphy Oil).
 30.  See Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 663 F. App’x. 613, 
615 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (enforcing the NLRB’s order in part and noting that there 
was no opt-out option).  The NLRB made clear that preserving employees’ access to the 
NLRB for the purpose of filing unfair labor practice charges does not save an otherwise 
illegal mandatory individual arbitration provision that bars collective action in both arbitral 
and judicial forums because access to administrative agencies is not access to class or 
collective adjudication in a judicial forum.  Solar City Corp., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at *1 
(Dec. 22, 2015); Lawrence E. Dubé, Agency Access Didn’t Save Illegal Arbitration Policy,
DAILY LAB. RPT. (BNA) No. 246, at A-2 (Dec. 22, 2105) (finding that employer violated 
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by maintaining and enforcing the agreement).
 31.  See D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2280 (2012) (noting that arbitration 
agreements that employees could reasonably construe as restricting engagement in Section 7 
protected concerted activity violate the NLRA), enf. denied in relevant part, 737 F.3d 344 
(5th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2014). 
 32.  D. R. Horton v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 737 F. 3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013); Cellular 
Sales of Mo., LLC v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 824 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 33.  Cellular Sales, 824 F.3d at 776. See Jon Steingart, Solo Arbitration Doesn’t 
Violate Right to Concerted Activity, DAILY LAB. RPT. (BNA) No. 103, at A-13 (June 2, 
2016), http://news.bna.com/dlln/display/batch_print_display.adp?searchid=29164715 
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The fifth case discussed, Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, involved 
employees at an accounting firm who signed a dispute resolution 
agreement (DRA) as a condition of employment that included a concerted 
action waiver preventing employees from joining together to arbitrate or 
bring legal claims.34  Employees Morris and McDaniel brought a class 
claim regarding their alleged misclassification to avoid overtime wages 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.35  The Ninth Circuit held that the 
individual arbitration provision was illegal under Section 7 of the NLRA 
because it waived the substantive federal right to act in concert with other 
employees when bringing legal claims, following the Seventh Circuit’s 
ruling in Lewis v. Epic Systems.36
The existing circuit split on class waivers developed as appeals 
trickled up in cases where several courts agreed with the Board’s rulings 
that mandatory individual arbitration provisions violate the NLRA.37  This 
paper examines the NLRB’s position on these controversial class action 
waivers within mandatory dispute resolution programs and makes 
recommendations for the courts’ treatment of mandatory individual 
arbitration provisions in employment disputes.  This paper recommends 
that in the absence of congressional action on pre-dispute class action 
waivers, courts should respect the essence of the NLRA in the employment 
[https://perma.cc/ZWY9-9DRK] (discussing Cellular Sales decision and developing circuit 
split on mandatory arbitration with collective action waiver with Fifth and Eighth now in 
agreement and Seventh siding with NLRB). 
 34.  Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted,
No. 16-300, 2017 WL 125665 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017). 
 35.  Id. (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. as well as California labor laws). 
 36.  Id. at 983-84 (citing Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, No. 16-285, 2017 WL 125664 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017)). 
 37.  See Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1260 (C.D. Cal. 
2016) (agreeing with NLRB position on D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil in case involving 
employee suing regarding minimum wage and overtime violations where dispute resolution 
policy was condition of employment and limited disputes to individual arbitration), appeal
filed, No. 16-55569 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2016).  Kellogg Brown appealed the case to the Ninth 
Circuit. See Dubé, supra note 26.  It should be noted that in Johnmohammadi v. 
Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2014), there was an opt-out provision on the 
mandatory individual arbitration provision which the district court found made the 
agreement valid, and the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling.  However, there 
was no opt-out provision in Totten. Totten, 152 F.Supp.3d at 1251.  In Morris, the Ninth 
Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Lewis—holding that mandatory class 
waivers violate the NLRA—but mentioned its ruling in Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s 
Inc., holding that there would be no Section 8 violation if “the employee there could have 
opted out of the individual dispute resolution agreement and chose not to.”  Morris, 834 
F.3d at 995 n.4.  In contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s view on opt-outs, the NLRB has ruled that 
opt-out provisions do not save otherwise invalid class action waivers.  On Assignment 
Staffing Servs., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *4, *6 (Aug. 27, 2015), rev’d summarily per 
curiam, No. 15-60642, 2016 WL 3685206 (5th Cir. June 6, 2016). 
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sphere and follow the Board and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.38
Since its decision in D. R. Horton, the NLRB has decided a host of 
cases upholding the principles it announced in D. R. Horton and reaffirmed 
in Murphy Oil, a principle that the Board has refused to waiver on despite 
the express refusal to enforce the agency’s decisions in the Fifth Circuit 
and now also at the Eight Circuit.39
I. AN OPT-OUT PROVISION DOES NOT SAVE A MANDATORY
ARBITRATION CLAUSE PROHIBITING JOINDER OF INDIVIDUAL
CLAIMS IN EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES - THE NLRB FURTHER
DEFINES CLASS WAIVER DOCTRINE
In On Assignment Staffing Services, Inc., the NLRB answered a 
question left unresolved in its earlier decisions in D. R. Horton40 and
Murphy Oil.41 In both of those opinions, the NLRB held that when 
employers require employees to waive their right to “joint, class, or 
collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other working 
conditions against their employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial” as a 
 38.  See Stone & Colvin, supra note 12, at 25 (noting the unlikelihood of passage of the 
proposed federal Arbitration Fairness Act, which would eliminate pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in the employment sphere).  There has been some action on the Arbitration 
Fairness Act which would amend the FAA to exclude consumer and employee disputes 
from mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, 
House Democrats Call for Curbs on Required Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/business/dealbook/house-democrats-call-for-curbs-on-
required-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/PZ2W-UG9F]; Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, 
H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015). The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017 was 
reintroduced by Senator Al Franken on March 7, 2017. 
 39.  See Daniel V. Kitzes & Shar Bahmani, NLRB Not Waffling on Pre-employment 
Class-Action Waivers Despite Fifth Circuit Reversals, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS:
EMPLOYMENT LAW WORLDVIEW (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.employmentlawworldview.com/ 
nlrb-not-waffling-on-pre-employment-class-action-waivers-despite-fifth-circuit-reversals/ 
[https://perma.cc/4X72-Y3J9] (noting the NLRB is not bending on its D. R. Horton line of 
decisions despite Fifth Circuit rejections).
 40.  D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2277 (2012).  The NLRB noted in its D. R. 
Horton opinion that it did not reach the question of whether “an employer can enter into an 
agreement that is not a condition of employment with an individual employee to resolve 
either a particular dispute or all potential employment disputes through non-class arbitration 
rather than litigation in court.” Id. at *13 n. 28. 
 41.  Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Oct. 28, 2014), enforcement denied 
in relevant part, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, No. 14-608000 (5th 
Cir. May 13, 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-307, 2017 WL 125666 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017).  On 
Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *4, 6 (Aug. 27, 2015) (finding 
the opt-out provisions interfere with Section 7 rights and are contrary to federal labor law 
policy), rev’d summarily per curiam, No. 15-60642, 2016 WL 3685206 (5th Cir. June 6, 
2016).
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condition of employment, they violate the NLRA.42  The NLRB stated that 
it is not an unfair labor practice if a union negotiates a collective bargaining 
agreement that provides for arbitration of employment and other disputes 
between an employer and employee(s) because, in that case, a union acts as 
a representative for the bargaining unit of employees, providing inherent 
access to employees’ group strength.43  The Board noted it is well settled 
that a properly certified or recognized union may waive certain rights under 
Section 7 in return for other concessions in the context of collective 
bargaining.44  The Board also clarified that it is a different matter if the 
arbitration agreement allows the employee to retain the right to bring a 
class action in court, because an employer’s requirement that an employee 
waive his or her right to collective or group arbitration would not present 
the same problem, as another avenue for collective action remains.45  The 
NLRB was clear that it was not mandating class arbitration in such 
circumstances.46
The NLRB in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil did not address the 
question whether an employer could avoid violating the NLRA when 
requiring employees to agree to individually arbitrate all employment 
claims, if the employees were afforded an opportunity to opt-out of the 
provision.47  Thus, the question was whether giving an employee an initial 
chance to opt-out of the arbitration provision rendered it acceptable since 
the mandatory aspect was ameliorated to a degree, making the arbitration 
alternative a choice, rather than a condition of, employment. 
In On Assignment, employees were allowed ten days after receipt of 
the employer’s dispute resolution agreement to opt-out of the individual 
arbitration procedure.48  Absent opting out, the employee’s signature 
acknowledging receipt of the agreement, along with the lapse of ten days, 
amounted to a waiver of the employee’s statutory right to collective or 
class action.49  The NLRB found that the possibility to opt-out did not make 
the agreement a choice rather than a condition of employment.50  Instead, 
 42.  Id. at *10.  Section 8 of the NLRA is violated when Section 7 rights are infringed.  
29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158.  
 43.  D. R. Horton, 557 N.L.R.B. at 2286. 
 44.  Id.
 45.  Id.
 46.  See id. at 2288 (“We need not and do not mandate class arbitration in order to 
protect employees’ rights under the NLRA . . . . So long as the employer leaves open a 
judicial forum for class and collective claims, employees’ NLRA rights are preserved 
without requiring the availability of classwide arbitration.”) 
 47.  On Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *1 (Aug. 27, 2015), 
rev’d summarily per curiam, No. 15-60642, 2016 WL 3685206 (5th Cir. June 6, 2016). 
 48.  Id.
 49.  Id.
 50.  Id.
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the opt-out procedure was viewed as a “second mandatory condition of 
employment” requiring affirmative action in order to retain the Section 7 
right to collective action.51  The Board viewed the requirement to act as a 
significant burden interfering with employees’ exercise of Section 7 
rights.52  The NLRB noted that the arbitration agreement, even assuming 
arguendo that the opt-out provision prevented it from being a condition of 
employment, nevertheless remained unlawful because it was a prospective 
waiver of the right to engage in concerted activity.53  Such agreements 
conflict with the purpose and policy of the NLRA and Norris-LaGuardia 
Acts by restricting employees’ rights to engage in Section 7 protected 
activities.54  This was so because of the prospective waiver of the right to 
engage in collective or class litigation in all forums in the absence of 
affirmatively opting out of the agreement within a very brief, specific time 
period.55
In addition, the complaint alleged that the waiver was irrevocable.56
The Dispute Resolution Agreement covered “any dispute arising out of or 
related to Employee’s employment with, or termination of 
employment . . . .” including employment disputes regarding statutory 
claims, and made individual final and binding arbitration the exclusive 
forum, specifically preventing access to court and a jury trial.57  An 
exception from coverage existed for private attorney general representative 
actions but nonetheless an employee was permitted to seek an individual 
remedy for such violations in arbitration.58
The class action waiver in On Assignment provided that employees 
would not be discriminated against for exercising their rights under Section 
7 of the NLRA but the company retained its right to enforce the waiver and 
seek dismissal of employees’ class, collective or representative claims, an 
arrangement that effectively undermined any exercise of class or collective 
rights.59  If this provision was deemed to be unenforceable or 
unconscionable, void or voidable, challenges to the provision would be 
decided by a judicial rather than an arbitral forum.60  The failure to opt out 
within ten days was deemed acceptance of the arbitration agreement.61
 51.  Id.
 52.  Id.
 53.  Id.
 54.  Id.
 55.  Id.
 56.  Id. at *2. 
 57.  Id.
 58.  Id.
 59.  Id.
 60.  Id. at *2-3. 
 61.  Id. at *3. 
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The NLRB outlined two questions regarding On Assignment’s
arbitration agreement: (1) whether it was a mandatory condition of 
employment, and therefore controlled by the D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil
decisions, and (2) whether the agreement was unlawful even if not 
mandatory.62  The NLRB quickly rejected the Employer’s assertion that the 
agreement was not mandatory because of the ten-day opt-out period, 
finding the agreement, along with its opt-out clause, were conditions of 
employment.63  The NLRB applied the test of whether an employer’s 
conduct “reasonably tends to interfere” with the exercise of employees’ 
Section 7 rights.64  The NLRB found that the opt-out procedure did 
reasonably interfere because it required employees to take specific 
affirmative steps within a ten-day period, or risk losing their statutory 
rights.65  Requiring employees to take such action in order to preserve 
rights is a burden on their exercise, just as a rule requiring permission or 
advance notice to an employer in order to engage in protected concerted 
activity would be unlawful.66
One of the reasons why opt-out provisions do not heal the Section 7 
problems inherent in imposing affirmative obligations on employees in 
order for them to preserve their statutory rights is that failure to act means 
employees lose their Section 7 rights.  Thus, the default position brought on 
by failure to opt-out is individual arbitration which bars concerted activity. 
It would be slightly less egregious if a mandatory arbitration agreement 
was an option to opt-in to individual arbitration, and the default was one 
that allowed the employee to retain Section 7 rights, because then at least 
the presumption would be in favor of retaining the right to engage in 
protected concerted activities.  But even with the latter opt-in option, the 
whole dynamic is creating a choice in a situation where the employer holds 
the power and the employee is forced to choose at her peril.  If the 
employee chooses to opt-out of arbitration, it could result in loss of 
employment or some perceived lack of support for the employer’s chosen 
system of dispute resolution.  In On Assignment, the NLRB quoted 
language from the Norris-LaGuardia Act to support its position that 
whether such agreements were imposed as conditions of employment or 
characterized as voluntary undertakings, they violate federal labor policy 
because “the ‘individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to 
exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and 
 62.  Id.
 63.  Id. at *4. 
 64.  Id. (citing American Freightways Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1959)). 
 65.  Id.
 66.  Id.
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thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment.”67
In addition, the opt-out procedure interfered with Section 7 rights 
because it required employees to make an “observable choice” illustrating 
their position concerning concerted activity.68  Free choice to exercise 
Section 7 rights includes freedom from employer knowledge of the 
employees’ views as well as freedom from fear of reprisal for pro-union 
views.69  Requiring employees to choose options that are unlawful— 
unlawful because they require irrevocable waiver of Section 7 rights or else 
declare their election to opt-out—places employees in a position where 
they would reasonably believe that choosing the opt-out would be 
perceived negatively by the employer because of its “strong preference” for 
the waiver.70  The opt-out procedure would result in an enduring record of 
the employee’s position on this issue and this too would tend to push 
employees in the opposite direction, defaulting to a permanent loss of 
Section 7 rights.71  The Board found that the arbitration agreement was 
unlawful, and the opt-out procedure itself was a burden on, and an 
interference with, exercise of Section 7 rights.72  The NLRB noted that the 
requirement of affirmative action to avoid the permanent waiver of 
substantive rights as well as the then diminished pool of those free to join 
in collective action underscored that even with an opt-out procedure, the 
dispute resolution agreement was a mandatory condition of employment.73
But even if the DRA was not a mandatory condition, the Board made clear 
that it would reach the same result.74
The NLRB went further in On Assignment than it did in D. R. Horton,
holding that even non-mandatory agreements with individual employees 
“to resolve . . . all potential employment disputes through non-class 
arbitration rather than litigation in court” were “contrary to the National 
Labor Relations Act and to fundamental principles of federal labor 
policy.”75  The Board held that the Federal Arbitration Act did not require 
the federal labor law to yield, reaffirming its consistent opposition to 
 67.  Id. at *8 (quoting Section 2, 29 U.S.C. § 102). 
 68.  Id. at *4 (citing Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 333 N.L.R.B. 734, 740 (2001)). 
 69.  Id. (citing Quemetco, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 470, 470 (1976) and Struksnes
Construction Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1062 (1967)). 
 70.  Id. at *5. 
 71.  Id.
 72.  Id.
 73.  Id. at *8 n.28 (citing Greene and O’Brien, supra note 5 at 119-20). 
 74.  Id.
 75.  Id. at *6 (quoting, in part, D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2289 n.28 
(2012), enf. denied in relevant part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, No. 
12-60031 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2014)). 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 10 S
ide A
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 10 Side A      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
1_O'BRIEN_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:30 PM
2017] WILL THE SUPREME COURT AGREE WITH THE NLRB? 529 
prospective waivers of Section 7 rights.76  Individual agreements that cede 
employees’ future assertion of collective rights are contrary to the NLRA.77
This is so even if the individual employment contracts are voluntary, and 
thus not a condition of employment.78  The problem with foreclosing all 
potential for collective action is that it curtails the “full freedom of 
association” that is protected by the NLRA.79  The NLRB refuted the 
existence of conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act, noting the Norris-
LaGuardia Act provides the FAA must yield to the NLRA should any 
arbitration initiative conflict with the public policy goals supporting the 
NLRA.80  The NLRB recognized the inequality of bargaining power 
between employers and individual employees such that the concept of 
voluntariness with respect to individual unorganized employees made little 
difference.81  Thus, whether considered voluntary or a condition of 
employment, prospective individual waivers of Section 7 collective action 
were both deemed illegal by the NLRB.82
In rejecting the dissent’s argument that employee acquiescence to a 
voluntary dispute resolution agreement with an opt-out provision is a ‘de 
minimis’ condition, the majority found that the right to engage in concerted 
legal activity is a fundamental substantive right.83 On Assignment required 
employees to act within ten days to reject the waiver provision, thus
obliging employees to act quickly in order to protect their Section 7 
rights.84  Absent employee action, the mandatory individual arbitration 
provision takes effect by default.  In On Assignment, the NLRB granted the 
General Counsel’s motion for summary judgment, finding the employer’s 
mandatory arbitration agreement violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and 
required the employer to discontinue the policy and notify employees of the 
discontinuation.85
Member Johnson’s dissent in On Assignment focused on contract law 
 76.  Id.
 77.  Id.
 78.  Id. at *7. 
 79.  Id. (citing Nat’l Licorice Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 309 U.S. 350, 362 
(1940)).
 80.  Id. at *7-8. 
 81.  Id. at *8. 
 82.  Id. (noting that the agreement in On Assignment was a condition of employment).  
 83.  Id. at *9 (citing Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at *8 (Oct. 28, 2014), 
enf. denied in relevant part, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, No. 14-
608000 (5th Cir. May 13, 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-307, 2017 WL 125666 (U.S. Jan. 13, 
2017)).
 84.  Id. at *8 (describing how the mandatory condition of employment puts an 
affirmative duty on employees to act if they wish not to be bound by the agreement). 
 85.  Id. at *1, *10-11 (mandating that respondent rescind or revise the agreement as 
well as post a notice at all locations where the agreement was in effect). 
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rather than labor law, objecting to the preemption of the common law of 
contracts by the NLRA.86  Yet that is the very thing that federal law is 
supposed to do, preempt state law when it is in direct conflict with it.  
Member Johnson also found that the opt-out opportunity made the 
arbitration agreement voluntary rather than mandatory, in contrast to the 
view of the majority.87  Because of his view that an employee was free to 
enter into the dispute resolution agreement or not as “an equal bargaining 
partner,” Member Johnson found that the DRA did not violate the Act.88
He dismissed the distinction between arbitration agreed to in collective 
bargaining agreements, as compared to arbitration agreements between an 
employer and an individual employee as making “no difference” since both 
consign dispute resolution to arbitration and waive Section 7 rights.89
However, in the collective bargaining context, the Section 7 right to 
collective action is not waived since it is collectively bargained for and 
agreed to by the union as representative of the employees. This is in 
contrast to the individual employee context, where there is no collective 
strength when an employee must quickly decide whether to risk the 
displeasure of a brand new employer’s preference for arbitration.  Member 
Johnson suggested that even if the individual arbitration agreement were “a 
prospective waiver of a substantive statutory right, a proper 
accommodation of the NLRA and the FAA would require finding that such 
a waiver does not violate the Act.”90  Board Member Johnson found this to 
be so because one of the FAA’s fundamental statutory attributes of 
arbitration is the irrevocability of an agreement to settle disputes by 
arbitration.91  Member Johnson determined this despite the fact that it is the 
Board’s responsibility to interpret the NLRA in light of changing industrial 
trends,92 one of which is the increasing employer imposition of arbitration 
upon individual employee’s workplace disputes, in most cases where there 
is “no union present or waiting in the wings.”93
 86.  Id. at *9, *11-12 (detailing how Member Johnson believes the majority has gone 
too far in rendering mandatory individual-specific arbitration contracts unlawful). 
 87.  Id. at *12-13 (noting how the Board does not have any special expertise in 
determining contractual questions and should defer to the courts). 
 88.  Id. at *14 (describing how employees who are free to accept or reject arbitration 
constitute equal bargaining partners). 
 89.  Id. at *15 (explaining the lack of a meaningful distinction in terms of individuals in 
both cases having the freedom the arbitrate). 
 90.  Id. at *16. 
 91.  Id. (describing this as one of the three fundamental attributes of arbitration under 
the FAA). 
 92.  See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975) 
(noting it is the Board’s responsibility to adapt the Act to changing industrial patterns and 
that courts must not “impermissibly encroach[] upon the Board’s function”). 
 93.  On Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *16 (Aug. 27, 
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The employer appealed the Board’s On Assignment decision to the 
Fifth Circuit.94  The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the NLRB’s decisions 
in D. R. Horton,95 Murphy Oil,96 and On Assignment.97  The only prospect 
for support of the NLRB’s position on mandatory individual arbitration 
agreements before the Fifth Circuit lies in its recent unpublished decision in 
which the panel found that such a provision violated the NLRA when it 
reasonably could be construed to bar access to filing unfair labor practice 
charges at the NLRB.98  In that case, however, there was no opt-out 
provision, a factor that seems to matter more to some courts than to the 
NLRB.99  The dissenter in On Assignment wrote that the majority could not 
find a single decision that supported the NLRB’s view in Murphy Oil,100
but there is growing evidence of judicial support for the NLRB’s position 
in the several recent cases discussed next. 
2015), rev’d summarily per curiam, No. 15-60642, 2016 WL 3685206 (5th Cir. June 6, 
2016).
 94.  On Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., No. 15-60642, 
2016 WL 3685206 (5th Cir. June 6, 2016). 
 95.  D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the NLRB did not give proper weight to the FAA, but also that the NLRB 
properly required Horton to make clear to its employees that the arbitration agreement did 
not preclude them from pursuing separate claims with the NLRB). 
96. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 808 F.3d 1013, 1021-22 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (holding that Murphy Oil’s petition was granted in that the corporation did not 
commit unfair labor practices, but their petition was denied regarding the Board’s desire for 
employers to clarify to employees that they could file separate claims), reh’g en banc 
denied, No. 14-608000 (5th Cir. May 13, 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-307, 2017 WL 
125666 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017). 
 97.  On Assignment Staffing Servs., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *5-8. 
 98.  Chesapeake Energy Corp., v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 633 F. App’x 613, 614-15 
(5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (holding that the petition for review is granted in part and the 
Board’s order is enforced in part).  
 99.  Chesapeake Energy Corp., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 80, at *1 (April 30, 2015) (noting 
mandatory individual arbitration agreement was a condition of employment and no opt-out 
provision was mentioned).  In Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
held that the availability of an opt-out made a class action waiver in an arbitration 
agreement legal under the NLRA.  755 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that 
Johnmohammadi could not claim that the enforcement of the agreement violates the NLRA 
because she had selected to arbitrate employment-related disputes on an individual basis).  
See Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 982 n.4 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted,
No. 16-300, 2017 WL 125665 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017). 
 100.  See On Assignment Staffing Servs., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *16 (Johnson, M., 
dissenting) (noting that the majority cannot point to a single decision that supports their 
view of the statutes, the NLRA and FAA). 
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II. MANDATORY ARBITRATION PROVISION PROHIBITING JOINDER
OF CLAIMS WITHOUT AN OPT-OUT CLAUSE: A FEDERAL
COURT IN CALIFORNIA FOLLOWS D. R. HORTON AND MURPHY
OIL
A trial court responding to procedural motions may start the process in 
motion that ultimately leads to a division of opinion among the circuit 
courts as both levels of federal courts interpret federal statutes in the 
context of enforcing federal administrative agency decisions or not.  Judge 
Gee’s opinion in Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, triggered a belated 
groundswell of support for the NLRB’s decision in D. R. Horton.101  This 
was so even though plaintiff David Totten filed claims regarding unpaid 
wages and meal breaks as well as premium overtime wages under 
California’s state labor code and Private Attorneys General Act.102  The 
defendants moved the case to federal court where they were partially 
successful in getting a motion to compel individual arbitration.103  Judge 
Gee upheld the Board’s position in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil in a case 
where a dispute resolution plan (DRP) was a condition of employment, and 
the DRP limited disputes to individual, rather than collective, arbitration.104
The DRP had a savings clause providing that if the DRP was held 
unenforceable, then it would not apply to class or representative actions 
“which shall proceed instead before the court.”105
Employee Totten claimed that he did not receive a copy of the DRP, 
despite signing an agreement acknowledging he had received and reviewed 
it and that certain legal claims would be resolved through arbitration rather 
than in court.106  Totten argued that the agreement was unconscionable and 
therefore void.107  As to the first prong of an unconscionability theory, 
Totten asserted the DRP was procedurally unconscionable because he was 
not given an opportunity to negotiate terms.108  The district court agreed, 
reasoning his argument was further supported by the employer’s failure to 
 101.  See Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1248 (C.D. Cal. 
2016) (granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion to compel arbitration as well 
as dismiss class and representative claims), appeal filed, No. 16-55569 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 
2016); see also Dubé, supra note 26, at 1 (“[Totten] may set the stage for another major test 
of the National Labor Relations Board’s view that arbitration agreements containing class 
action waivers interfere with the labor law rights of employees.”). 
 102.  Totten, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 1243. 
 103.  Id. at 1248.
 104.  Id. at 1256-66. 
 105.  Id. at 1248, 1267. 
 106.  Id. at 1250. 
 107.  Id.
 108.  Id. at 1250. 
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give the employee a copy of the DRP or associated rules.109  As to the 
second prong of the theory, substantive unconscionability, Totten asserted 
the following: a lack of mutuality; the ability of the employer to 
unilaterally modify the terms (which the court severed based upon a 
severability clause in the agreement); a requirement that the discovery costs 
be borne by the party taking the discovery, that attorneys’ fees to be 
awarded by an arbitrator to either party including the company, and that the 
class and representative waivers violated the NLRA and California public 
policy.110
The court did not find a lack of mutuality, but did find the 
modification provision illusory and therefore unconscionable.111  The 
discovery costs and attorneys’ fee provisions were not substantively 
unconscionable in the court’s view.112  However, the court upheld the 
NLRB’s assertion that class action waivers violated Section 7 substantive 
rights, finding the Supreme Court’s precedents concerning arbitration 
inapplicable since they did not squarely address substantive federal 
statutory rights.113  The federal district court agreed with the dissent in D. 
R. Horton II, holding that the arbitration agreement’s interference with a 
substantive statutory right made it unenforceable.114  In addition, the court 
noted that none of the cases cited by the defendants were controlling 
precedent, nor were these cases persuasive due to a lack of substantive 
analysis of what the court, as well as the NLRB for that matter, perceived 
to be the critical issue, namely, the class action waiver’s interference with 
substantive statutory rights of the NLRA.115  Thus, the trial court refused to 
enforce the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement and held that 
the class could proceed to court.116
Just a few weeks later, Judge Wright from the same federal district 
court issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part defendant 
Kellogg Brown & Root’s motion to compel arbitration against Totten on 
claims covered by the mandatory arbitration provision.117  The district court 
found that there was no evidence of substantive unconscionability and only 
 109.  Id. at 1251. 
 110.  Id. at 1252. 
 111.  Id.
 112.  Id. at 1253-54. 
 113.  Id. at 1260-61. 
 114.  Id. at 1264-65 (explaining how Judge Graves agreed with the Board that the 
arbitration agreement interferes with substantive rights afforded to the employees (citing D. 
R. Horton II, 737 F.3d 344, 364-65 (5th Cir. 2013) (Graves, J., dissenting)). 
 115.  Id. at 1265. 
 116.  Id. at 1256. 
 117.  Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, No. 5:15-cv-01876-ODW-KKx, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18558 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016). 
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minimal procedural unconscionability regarding the KBR arbitration 
program, and thus for claims that qualified under that program, the court 
granted KBR’s motion to compel arbitration.118  However, because Totten’s 
Section 7 claims were not subject to the arbitration program in light of a 
specific exemption regarding such claims, these were not submitted to 
arbitration.119  State law claims that Totten initially brought in state court 
were not specifically exempted from arbitration and thus “may be subject 
to arbitration” according to the court.120  Totten claimed that the arbitration 
provision was an adhesion contract that was “implicitly procedurally 
unconscionable” and that KBR’s failure to provide a copy of the program 
to him was similarly procedurally unconscionable.121  The court found that 
since Totten signed an acknowledgement that he had read and agreed to the 
DRP, he failed to prove that he did not agree to it and his procedural 
unconscionability argument failed.122
With respect to Totten’s substantive unconscionability arguments, the 
court found none persuasive.123  This was so because the arbitrator-
determined discovery was deemed adequate, mutuality was not lacking 
since both parties were bound by the DRP, the ability to unilaterally modify 
terms applied to prospective disputes only, and attorneys’ fees were 
awardable by the arbitrator to the prevailing party based upon applicable 
law.124  There was no mention of Section 7 of the NLRA, D. R. Horton, or 
Murphy Oil in the district court’s order in February. 
Thereafter, in April, an NLRB ALJ ruled on the legality of Kellogg 
Brown & Root’s DRP.125  The judge found that KBR engaged in unfair 
labor practices by maintaining a mandatory individual arbitration policy as 
a condition of employment that prohibited employees from pursuing claims 
in a class or representative capacity in both judicial and arbitral forums, and 
seeking to enforce the policy against the Charging Party, Totten.126  The 
ALJ ordered the employer to rescind or revise the existing DRP, in 
accordance with the NLRB’s requirements as stated in D. R. Horton and 
Murphy Oil, as well as ordered it to notify Totten and other employees of 
the changes.127  The judge noted the federal district court’s decision in 
 118.  Id. at *14.
 119.  Id. at *5-7. 
 120.  Id. at *6-7. 
 121.  Id. at *7. 
 122.  Id. at *10-11. 
 123.  Id. at *11. 
 124.  Id. at *10-14. 
 125.  Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, 2016 NLRB LEXIS 257, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 4, 
2016).
 126.  Id. at *12-14. 
 127.  Id. at *13. 
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Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root and its pending appeal at the Ninth 
Circuit, indicating that KBR must notify the appellate court of the 
rescission and revision of its DRP, as well as withdraw objections to 
Totten’s class claims.128  The ALJ also ordered the employer to pay Totten 
for expenses resulting from its opposition to the class claims, and post a 
notice onsite as well as electronically regarding the ALJ’s order.129  The 
outcome of the Totten appeal at the Ninth Circuit may add to the circuit 
split begun by the Seventh Circuit, discussed next. 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS A FEDERAL DISTRICT
DECISION ENFORCING THE BOARD’S POSITION IN D. R.
HORTON AND MURPHY OIL
In another federal district court decision, Lewis v. Epic Systems 
Corp.,130 the court once again agreed with the NLRB’s position in D. R. 
Horton.131  District Court Judge Crabb cited her earlier decision in 
Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage Corp.,132 a case that she noted involved 
a similar waiver in an arbitration clause to the instant case.133  In
Waterstone, Judge Crabb found the waiver inconsistent with the NLRB’s 
D. R. Horton decision.134 She noted that the Board’s reasoning was 
straightforward and that both the Board and the courts have found that 
lawsuits for unpaid wages by multiple plaintiffs are one type of protected 
concerted activity under Section 7 of the Act.135  Thus, according to the 
court, Waterstone’s waiver on collective action in the arbitration agreement 
violated §8(a)(1) of the NLRA.136
When Waterstone sought reconsideration of the district court’s 
decision based upon the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to enforce D. R. Horton,
Judge Crabb once again found in favor of the NLRB because the Fifth 
 128.  Id. at *14 (citing Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1243 
(C.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-55569 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2016)). 
 129.  Id. at *14-15. 
 130.  Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., No. 15-CV-82-BBC, 2015 WL 5330300, at *1 (W.D. 
Wis. Sept. 11, 2015), aff’d, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-285, 2017 
WL 125664 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017). 
 131.  D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2278-80 (2012), enf. denied in relevant 
part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 
2014).
 132. Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage Corp., 993 F. Supp. 2d 940 (W.D. Wisc. 2014). 
 133.  Lewis, 2015 WL 5330300, at *1. 
 134.  Id.
 135.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 136.  Id. at *2 (citing Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., No. 11-CV-779-BBC, 
2012 WL 1242318, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012)). 
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Circuit’s majority opinion did not persuade her otherwise.137  The court 
found that no distinction was made by the respondent employer between 
the collective action waivers in Waterstone and Epic Systems.138  Because 
the waiver at Epic had a savings clause—providing that if the class or 
collective claim waiver was found to be unenforceable, then any class, 
collective, or representative action must be filed in court as the exclusive 
forum—the court noted that its decision that the waiver was invalid made 
the rest of plaintiff’s argument moot and resulted in a denial of the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.139  It should be noted that this savings clause 
appears to cut off administrative agency claims, or a reasonable person 
would so conclude, something that the NLRB finds problematic. 
The oral argument in the Epic Systems appeal took place on February 
12, 2016, and the Seventh Circuit granted the NLRB’s motion to participate 
in the oral argument, which it did towards the end of the session.140  This 
was the first time that the NLRB participated in an oral argument as an 
amicus at the appellate level on the class waiver issue.141  During the 
 137.  Id. (holding that the majority never persuasively challenged the Board’s 
conclusion).
 138.  Id.
 139.  Id. at *1, *3. 
 140.  See Albina Gasanbekova, Building a Circuit Split: Updating Moves by the NLRB 
on Class Waivers, 34 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG., Issue 4, 60-64 (Apr. 
2016).  The oral argument in Lewis v. Epic Systems is available at http://media.ca7.uscourts. 
gov/sound/2016/sk.15-2997.15-2997_02_12_2016.mp3 [https://perma.cc/6R2Y-WVTS]. 
 141.  See Gasanbekova, supra note 140.  The NLRB submitted an amicus brief in Lewis
v. Epic Systems Corp., Case No. 15-2997 (NLRB Amicus Brief filed Dec. 16, 2015) and in 
Morris v. Ernst & Young, Case No. 13-16599 (9th Cir. NLRB Amicus Brief filed Nov. 6, 
2015) but the Board did not participate in the oral argument of the Morris case.  The NLRB 
also filed an amicus brief regarding Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co., Case No. 15-
2820, (2nd Cir. NLRB Amicus Brief filed Dec. 23, 2015) in an appeal from Patterson v. 
Raymours Furniture Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  In Patterson, the federal 
district court held that an employment arbitration provision was enforceable, rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that the employee arbitration program (EAP) carved out rights under 
the NLRA.  The district court noted that the EAP stated that the right to file an unfair labor 
practice charge under the NLRA was not prevented, and the court found that the class action 
waiver overrode the EAP’s language that might be read to include collective activity outside 
of filing an unfair labor practice claim at the NLRB.  The court found no new arguments 
were asserted by the plaintiff that would persuade it to alter its earlier opinion in Sutherland
v. Ernst & Young LLP., 726 F.3d 290, 296 (2nd Cir. 2013).  In Sutherland, the Second 
Circuit followed the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Italian Colors ruling that the 
prohibitive cost of individual arbitration on a low value, high cost claim did not prevent 
effective vindication of an employee’s rights. Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 292-98.  The Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court in Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., 659 F. 
App’x. 40, 41-42 (2nd Cir. 2016) petition for cert. filed, No. 16-388 (U.S. Sept. 22, 2016), 
finding that the EAP which prohibited class or collective adjudication of work-related 
claims was not illegal.  The appellate court noted that it was following its earlier precedent 
in Sutherland, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013), which it was bound to follow absent an en banc 
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argument, Chief Judge Wood appeared to agree with the NLRB, sounding 
as if she would recommend upholding D. R. Horton and affirming the 
district court’s position.  Judge Wood noted the same issue was decided 
regarding contracts stating an employee would not join a union, and that 
the benefits of arbitration remain even if a class participates, which was 
something that the class waiver prohibited. The attorney for the NLRB 
noted that the Section 7 right to collective activity is a substantive one, and 
that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer involved the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which did not involve a 
substantive collective right.  He noted further that the Court’s decision in 
Concepcion did not involve Section 7 of the NLRA and thus it was not 
controlling.142  Instead, the Court’s decisions in National Licorice,143 J. I. 
Case,144 and Stone145 are relevant, as these cases all hold that the Section 7 
right cannot be waived by individual contract. 
The NLRB’s amicus brief in the Epic Systems case reiterated the 
Board’s holding from D. R. Horton as reaffirmed in Murphy Oil, that 
waivers of collective action in any and all forums, signed as a condition of 
employment, violate the NLRA, reaffirming the principle that individual 
employees cannot waive Section 7 rights prospectively.146  The Board’s 
Brief noted that the United States Supreme Court has not spoken to the 
issue of waivers of collective action in light of the Section 7 right to engage 
in concerted activity.147  Collective action for mutual protection is so 
central to the NLRA that waivers depriving employees of this right are thus 
illegal and unenforceable, and fall within the FAA’s savings clause.148  In 
or Supreme Court ruling to the contrary.  Nonetheless, the court noted that “[i]f we were 
writing on a clean slate, we might well be persuaded, for the reasons forcefully stated in 
Chief Judge Wood’s and Chief Judge Thomas’s opinions in Lewis and Morris, to join the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits and hold that the EAP’s waiver of collective action is 
unenforceable.” Patterson, 2016 WL 4598542 at *3.  The employees from Raymours 
Furniture have since filed a petition for certiorari as they continue to seek a class action 
against the company.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co., 
Inc., No. 16-388 (U.S. Sept. 22, 2016). 
 142.  Lewis oral argument supra note 140. 
 143.  Nat’l Licorice Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 309 U.S. 350, 367 (1940) (holding 
that the contracts were in violation of the NLRA). 
 144.  J. I. Case Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 321 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1944) (holding 
that the contracts were invalid because they were used to prevent employees from taking 
advantage of benefits that were given to them through collective action). 
 145.  Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Stone, 125 F. 2d 752, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1942) 
(claiming that the blanket provision in the contract was unenforceable).  
 146.  Brief for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellee at 2, Lewis v. Epic Systems, 823 F.3d 1147 (Dec. 16, 2015) (No. 15-2997), 2015 
WL 9391946. 
 147.  Id. at 4. 
 148.  Id. at 19-21. 
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addition, the NLRA is a clear congressional command that overrides the 
FAA enforcement of contracts that inherently conflict with it.149  The 
Board’s Amicus Brief noted the fatal flaw in the reasoning of the circuit 
courts that have refused to enforce the holding of D. R. Horton, namely that 
the Supreme Court’s precedents on the FAA have not spoken to this issue 
and thus are not dispositive because the other decisions have not involved 
the NLRA, a statute that is different than the others considered.150
Chief Judge Wood authored the opinion of the Seventh Circuit, 
affirming the district court’s decision denying Epic’s motion to compel 
arbitration in the Lewis case.151  The judge noted that Epic’s email to 
employees containing the arbitration agreement provided no option to opt-
out of the agreement, that employees were considered to have accepted the 
agreement if they continued employment, and that the email contained 
instructions to review and acknowledge their agreement by clicking two 
buttons.152  Lewis complied with these instructions but later sought relief 
from alleged Fair Labor Standards Act violations in federal district court.153
The district court agreed with Lewis and the NLRB’s D. R. Horton ruling 
that the individual arbitration with collective action waiver violated the 
NLRA because it interfered with employees’ concerted activities for 
mutual aid and protection.154
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo.155
The appellate court outlined longstanding precedent holding that the NLRA 
prevents employers from imposing contractual waivers of Section 7 rights 
to engage in concerted activities upon individual employees.156  Collective 
legal proceedings are included in such concerted activities, and assist in 
equalizing the bargaining power of employees, one of the central purposes 
of the NLRA.157  Following the NLRB’s reasoning in D. R. Horton, the 
Seventh Circuit deferred to the Board’s sensible interpretation of the 
statutory language, finding that employers may not use such individual 
waivers to bar access to collective remedies.158  The court noted that 
“Section 7’s . . . text signals that the activities protected are to be construed 
broadly.”159  Congress was aware of various forms of collective action 
 149.  Id. at 22. 
 150.  Id. at 23-27. 
 151.  Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1151. 
 152.  Id.
 153.  Id.
 154.  Id.
 155.  Id.
 156.  Id. at 1152. 
 157.  Id. at 1153. 
 158.  Id.
 159.  Id. at 1154 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157). 
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including legal proceedings when it enacted the NLRA, and, in light of the 
plain language of Section 7 and 8 of the Act, contract provisions seeking to 
waive employees’ access to such remedies are unenforceable.160
The court declared that Epic’s arbitration provision impinged on 
Section 7 rights, running “straight into the teeth of Section 7” in that it 
prohibited collective, representative, or class legal proceedings which are 
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection.161  Such provisions are 
unlawful under the NLRA and unenforceable.162  The Seventh Circuit 
outlined that their earlier opinion in NLRB v. Stone, which it noted had not 
been undermined, would prompt a different conclusion from that reached 
by the Ninth Circuit in Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc.163  Thus, 
unlike the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the availability of an opt-out 
from the individual arbitration and class waiver cured the illegality, the 
Seventh Circuit’s earlier decision in NLRB v. Stone held that where an 
individual is “obligated to bargain individually,” an arbitration agreement 
limiting Section 7 rights was a per se violation of the NLRA which could 
not “be legalized by showing the contract was entered into without 
coercion.”164  Nonetheless, despite the Seventh Circuit’s dicta regarding the 
ability of an opt-out to cure such a provision, the court disclaimed the need 
to resolve this dissonance between the circuits since, in the instant case, 
Epic provided no opt-out to its agreement, making its arbitration provision 
a clear condition of continued employment that interfered with employees 
exercising their Section 7 rights.165
Next the court turned to the impact of the Federal Arbitration Act on 
employees’ rights under the NLRA, responding to Epic’s contention that 
the FAA should override the NLRA.166  The court essentially followed the 
NLRB’s reasoning in D. R. Horton, that the FAA savings clause permits 
invalidation of agreements to arbitrate relating to generally applicable 
contract defenses, of which illegality is one such ground, ensuring that the 
two statutes “work hand in glove.”167  Unlike the Fifth Circuit in D. R. 
 160.  Id.
 161.  Id. at 1155. 
 162.  Id. (citing Nat’l Licorice Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 309 U.S. 350, 361 
(1940) and D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2280 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part,
737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2014)). 
 163.  Id. (citing Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1942) 
and Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 164.  Id. (citing Stone, 125 F.2d at 756). 
 165.  Id.  As noted in Part I above, the NLRB ruled that opt-outs do not cure an 
otherwise illegal collective action waiver when it decided On Assignment Staffing Servs., 
Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *1 (Aug. 27, 2015), rev’d summarily per curiam, No. 15-
60642, 2016 WL 3685206 (5th Cir. June 6, 2016). 
 166.  Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1156. 
 167.  Id. at 1157. 
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Horton, the Seventh Circuit saw no conflict between the two statutes in 
light of the operation of the FAA’s savings clause, the FAA’s silence 
regarding the necessity of individual arbitration, and the NLRA’s pro-
arbitration stance in that it “expressly allows unions and employers to 
arbitrate disputes between each other.”168  The problem with Epic’s 
provision was that it banned collective action including collective 
arbitration and thus it “ran up against the substantive right to act 
collectively that the NLRA gives to employees.”169
The court stated that the two statutes in question are both federal and 
on “equal footing.”170  The FAA’s savings clause prevents the FAA from 
mandating the enforcement of the collective action waiver, and works with 
the NLRA’s prohibition of employers interfering with employees’ 
protected concerted activities.171  In Lewis v. Epic Systems, the Seventh 
Circuit noted that the NLRA makes it illegal for an employer contracting 
with an individual to waive his Section 7 rights, and that even the attempt 
to do so is unlawful.172  The court declined to find that the NLRA was in 
conflict with the FAA, stating that this would make the FAA’s savings 
clause “a nullity,” which runs contrary to rules of statutory construction 
requiring the reading of all words and clauses as having meaning.173  The 
court agreed with the NLRB that Section 7 rights are substantive, the very 
core of the statute, with the rest of the NLRA serving to enforce the rights 
that Section 7 protects.174  The court noted that a “ ‘prospective waiver of a 
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies’—that is, of a substantive right—
are not enforceable.”175  The court distinguished the substantive right to 
collective action in Section 7 of the NLRA from the procedural device of 
class actions under other employment statutes, finding that the collective 
process was central to the Section 7 right, and that other employment 
statutes do not guarantee collective process but “[t]he NLRA does.”176
The court compared the associational rights embodied in the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to the collective right in Section 7, 
finding that it would be “odd indeed to consider . . . [the First Amendment 
right] non-substantive.”177  This was a brilliant comparison that showed the 
 168.  Id. at 1158.  The court noted that collective bargaining agreements “require 
employees to arbitrate individual employment disputes.” Id.
 169.  Id.
 170.  Id.
 171.  See id. at 1158-59 (explaining why the NRLA is not in conflict with the FAA). 
 172.  Id. at 1159. 
 173.  Id.
 174.  Id. at 1159-60. 
 175.  Id. at 1160. 
 176.  Id. at 1161. 
 177.  Id.
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court’s strong belief in the importance of the associational right in Section 
7 by equating it to the associational rights safeguarded by the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  Just as the First Amendment is 
foundational to the Bill of Rights, Section 7 is the foundation of the NLRA, 
which has also been equated to a workplace bill of rights.178  The NLRB 
looks to protect the exercise of Section 7 rights in much the same way that 
courts protect the exercise of First Amendment rights, and both have good 
reason to look askance at prior restraints on the exercise or restraint from 
exercise of these fundamental rights.  The Seventh Circuit agreed with the 
NLRB’s position on mandatory individual arbitration provisions with class 
waivers, and noted that none of the courts that disagreed with the NLRB 
have “engaged substantively with the relevant arguments.”179
IV. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT DECIDES AGAINST THE NLRB ON THE 
PRIMARY ISSUE OF THE LEGALITY OF A COLLECTIVE ACTION 
WAIVER IN AN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT, WIDENING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Exactly one week after the Seventh Circuit issued its ruling supporting 
the NLRB in Lewis v. Epic Systems, the Eighth Circuit found that a similar 
collective action waiver in an arbitration agreement did not violate the 
NLRA, following its own precedent in Owen v. Bristol Care and similar 
rulings from the Fifth Circuit.180  In Cellular Sales of Missouri, the panel 
granted the employer’s petition for review in part, and denied it in part.181
The denial affected the bulk of the NLRB’s order relating to the arbitration 
provision’s class waiver that the NLRB had found violated the NLRA.182
When John Bauer was hired as an employee in January 2012, he 
signed an employment agreement as a condition of employment.183  The 
agreement required individual arbitration of all claims, disputes or 
 178.  See Christine Neylon O’Brien, Am I Blue or Seeing Red? The NLRB Sees Purple 
When Employer Communications Policies Unduly Restrict Section 7 Rights, 66 LAB. L. J.
75, 75 (2015) (stating Section 7 provides employees with a workplace bill of rights); see
also AGIP USA, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 1144, 1145 (1972) (“[T]he Act was intended to be a 
‘bill of rights both for American workingmen and their employers . . . .’”) (quoting 
McCulloch v. Sociedad National de Marineros de Honduras, 371 U.S. 931 (1963). 
 179.  Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1159. 
 180.  Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 824 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 
2016) (citing Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013)). 
 181.  Id.
 182.  Id. at 775. See also Greene & O’Brien, supra note 5, at 121 (arguing that courts 
that discredit the Board’s D. R. Horton decision have not “given serious consideration to the 
merits of the Board’s analysis and the fact that the case raises issues that have not been 
addressed by the Supreme Court”). 
 183.  Cellular Sales, 824 F.3d at 774. 
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controversies related to his employment and waived class, collective or 
representative proceedings.184  The arbitration was final, binding and while 
enforceable in court, it was not appealable.185  When Bauer’s employment 
ended in May 2012, he brought a class action in federal court alleging 
FLSA violations.186  The district court granted the employer’s motion to 
compel arbitration of the dispute pursuant to the employment agreement.187
Bauer proceeded to arbitration where the parties settled and the lawsuit was 
dismissed.188  Meanwhile, Bauer filed an unfair labor practice charge at the 
NLRB in light of the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement that 
he was required to sign.189  The Board issued a complaint, an ALJ ruled in 
favor of the Board, and the NLRB affirmed.190  The Board’s order required 
the employer to rescind the arbitration agreement or revise it to preserve 
employees’ rights to pursue collective action in some forum, either arbitral 
or judicial, and not restrict employees ability to file charges at the NLRB.191
After reviewing the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law de
novo, the court refused to defer to the NLRB’s legal interpretation beyond 
that relating to the NLRA.192 Looking at the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to 
enforce the NLRB in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil, and its own decision in 
Owen v. Bristol Care, the Eighth Circuit granted the employer’s petition for 
review and refused to enforce the NLRB’s order regarding the class or 
collective action waiver.193  However, the court enforced the part of the 
Board’s order relating to the fact that the arbitration provision could 
reasonably be construed to bar employees from filing charges at the 
NLRB.194  Without a savings clause to clarify that employees retained the 
right to file charges at the NLRB, the court agreed with the NLRB that the 
provision violated the Act and must be cured.195  The employer argued that 
the arbitration agreement did not expressly prohibit employees from filing 
charges with the Board, nor did it mention agency or administrative 
 184.  Id.
 185.  Id.
 186.  Id.
 187.  Id. at 774-75. 
 188.  Id. at 775. 
 189.  Id.
 190.  Id.
 191.  Id.
 192.  Id.
 193.  Id. at 776 (citing Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053-55 (8th Cir. 
2013); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013); 
and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 
2015), reh’g en banc denied, No. 14-608000 (5th Cir. May 13, 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-
307, 2017 WL 125666 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017)). 
 194.  Id. at 777-78. 
 195.  Id. at 778. 
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proceedings, and thus it would not reasonably be construed to bar such 
filings.196  The court was not persuaded by this argument and cited the Fifth 
Circuit’s similar conclusion in D. R. Horton.197  The breadth of the 
arbitration provision, as well as its generality, worked against the 
employer’s argument, and the court noted that this was an area where the 
Board was entitled to deference in its reasonable interpretation of the 
arbitration agreement.198
It is interesting that even the circuits that do not support the NLRB on 
the main issue regarding the illegality of class or collective action waivers 
in pre-dispute individual arbitration agreements, do agree with the NLRB 
about provisions that reasonably could be construed as barring the filing of 
claims at the NLRB.  This could be in part because of the strong statutory 
provisions supporting employee access to the Board’s processes.  As the 
NLRB instructs, 
Section 8(a)(4) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer 
“to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee 
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.”  
This provision guards the right of employees to seek the 
protection of the Act by using the processes of the NLRB . . . . 
[I]t forbids an employer to discharge, layoff, or engage in other 
forms of discrimination in working conditions against employees 
who have filed charges with the NLRB, given affidavits to NLRB 
investigators, or testified at an NLRB hearing.  Violations of this 
section are in most cases also violations of Section 8(a)(3).199
Protecting access to NLRB processes is clearly protected by the 
language of the statute which is aimed at preventing employer interference 
with Section 7 rights, and the Board’s test with respect to determining if an 
employer mandated arbitration provision would reasonably be construed to 
bar access to the NLRB is a logical one that deserves the deference of the 
courts.  However, the larger issue of the class waiver itself remains 
incorrectly decided by the Fifth, Eighth and Second Circuits.200
 196.  Id. at 777. 
 197.  Id. at 777-78 (citing D. R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 363-64). 
 198.  Id. at 778. 
 199.  See NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW UNDER THE STATUTE AND PROCEDURES OF 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 20 (1997), https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/ 
default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3024/basicguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/25BP-
9KQD]. 
 200.  See Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(following the Eighth Circuit’s lead in Owen v. Bristol Care by rejecting the NLRA 
argument on class waiver’s illegality because court owed no deference to the NLRB’s 
preferences on remedial policies “where such preferences potentially trench upon federal 
statutes and policies unrelated to the NLRA”).  It is noteworthy that the class waiver issue 
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V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT FOLLOWS THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S EPIC
DECISION SUPPORTING THE NLRB’S RULE THAT MANDATORY
CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVERS VIOLATE THE 
NLRA
In Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
Seventh that substantive rights under the National Labor Relations Act 
prevent employers from mandating individual arbitration as the exclusive 
remedy for employment disputes.201  The Morris decision is particularly 
important because the Ninth Circuit is the largest circuit—encompassing 
nine states—and the court’s decision considerably strengthens the NLRB’s 
position as well as that of the Seventh Circuit on this issue.202  Both the 
Seventh and the Ninth Circuit majority opinions thoroughly explored the 
NLRB’s arguments, finding that such DRA provisions cannot waive the 
substantive federal statutory right to act in concert, with the Ninth deeming 
Ernst & Young’s separate proceedings clause the “‘very antithesis’ of § 7’s 
substantive right to pursue concerted work-related legal claims.”203  The 
court further noted that “§7 rights would amount to very little if employers 
could simply require their waiver.”204  The majority made clear that the 
savings clause in the Federal Arbitration Act prevented any conflict with 
the NLRA, finding that the “arbitration requirement [wa]s not the 
problem,” rather the same problem would arise if the contract provided for 
individual court adjudication as the sole remedy.205  Instead, the problem 
was the restriction on concerted activity in the only forum allowed.206  The 
Ninth Circuit stated that “an employer may not defeat the right by requiring 
goes well beyond the Board’s ‘remedial preferences’ as these provisions undermine the 
most basic employee rights under the NLRA. See also Jon Steingart, Solo Arbitration 
Violates Right to Concerted Activity, 162 DAILY LAB. RPT. (BNA) at A-1 (Aug. 22, 2016) 
(quoting Professor Charlotte Garden of Seattle University School of Law that the Second 
and Eleventh Circuits rejected the NLRB rule “in drive-by fashion”). 
 201. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 980-84 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted,
No. 16-300, 2017 WL 125665 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017). 
 202.  See Matthew Bultman, Class Waiver Battle Appears Destined for Supreme Court,
LAW360 (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/832230/class-waiver-battle-
appears-destined-for-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/V9A4-GTEZ] (noting that the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision was another win for workers and similar to the Seventh Circuit’s previous 
ruling, but it also conflicted with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits). 
 203.  Morris, 834 F.3d at 983 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting J.H. Stone & Sons, 125 F.2d 752 
(7th Cir. 1942)). 
 204.  Id.
 205.  Id. at 984. 
 206.  See id. at 989 (holding that the NLRA establishes a substantive right to concerted 
activity and Ernst & Young’s “separate proceeding” provision interferes with this right by 
precluding concerted work-related claims). 
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employees to pursue all work-related legal claims individually.”207  Nor 
may the employer condition employment on signing such a contract.208
The appellate court vacated the district court’s order compelling arbitration 
and remanded for the court to determine if the separate proceedings clause 
was severable.209
Despite the victory for employees represented in Morris, the decision 
itself was divided two-to-one, with Judge Ikuta writing a lengthy and 
pointed dissent that objected to the majority’s violation of the FAA’s 
mandate to enforce arbitration agreements and U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent.210  This case will be heard at the U.S. Supreme Court.211  As it 
stands, the Ninth Circuit’s decision follows the carefully crafted opinion of 
the Seventh Circuit in Lewis, which the majority noted was the only other 
circuit court to address the merits of the issue.212  The opinion emphasized 
the centrality of Section 7 of the NLRA, which creates substantive rights 
that cannot be waived in individual arbitration agreements that represent 
the exclusive mechanism for dispute resolution.  The court held that “[t]he 
NLRA precludes contracts that foreclose the possibility of concerted work-
related legal claims.”213
VI. OPTIONS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF MANDATORY PRE-
DISPUTE ARBITRATION WITH CLASS WAIVERS FOR 
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT SHOULD BE
RESOLVED AND THE POSSIBILITY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION
There is considerable discussion about the conflict between the NLRB 
and the courts on the mandatory class action waiver issue and how it should 
or will play out.214  The NLRB clearly upped its game by entering into 
 207.  Id. at 983 (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 321 U.S. 332, 337 
(1944)).
 208.  Id. at 990. 
 209.  Id.
 210.  Id. at 990-98 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 211.  See Lawrence E. Dubé, Justices Will Consider Class Action Waivers, 26 DAILY
LAB. RPT. (BNA) No. 9, AA-1 (Jan. 13, 2017) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari for three NLRA related cases, including Morris).
 212.  Morris, F.3d at 930 n.16 
 213.  Id. at 990 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 214.  See William Emanuel et al., NLRB Continues Attack on Class and Collective 
Action Waivers, LITTLER MENDELSON (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.littler.com/publication-
press/publication/nlrb-continues-attack-class-and-collective-action-waivers 
[https://perma.cc/Z5P4-2VJM] (outlining NLRB decisions, issues, and Supreme Court 
guidance); Gordon W. Renneisen, Lewis v. Epic Systems: An Ongoing Debate Over Class 
Waivers, LAW360 (June 13, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/805857/lewis-v-epic-
systems-an-ongoing-debate-over-class-waivers [https://perma.cc/H6U4-L5XK] (noting that 
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cases on appeal that did not originate from complaints brought to the 
agency.  The Board has also turned away from courts of appeal, such as the 
Fifth Circuit, that do not agree with its holding in D. R. Horton, and instead 
followed its standard policy of non-acquiescence.  This means that unless 
the Supreme Court tells the agency it is wrong, it is not going to change its 
course on the mandatory arbitration issue.  Now that the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits have shown clear support for the NLRB, in sharp contrast to the 
Fifth and Eighth Circuits in particular, it will be up to the Supreme Court to 
make a decision between substantive rights under the NLRA and private 
contractual agreements that waive such rights of individual employees.  
The NLRB filed for certiorari regarding the Fifth Circuit’s decision to deny 
enforcement or rehearing en banc in the Murphy Oil USA, Inc. decision, 
and the Board also filed a petition in another case from the Fifth Circuit, 
National Labor Relations Board v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc.215  Epic 
Systems filed a notice that it planned to appeal its loss at the Seventh 
Circuit to the U.S. Supreme Court, and subsequently filed a petition for 
certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.216  Ernst & Young also filed a 
petition for certiorari, and employees at Raymours Furniture filed a petition 
for certiorari appealing the Second Circuit’s decision to send each 
employment dispute to individual arbitration.217
There are other appellate decisions that the Board or a defeated 
employer may appeal to the Supreme Court as well.  There has been a 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in late May addressed all of the relevant arguments regarding 
interpretation of the NLRA and the effect on the FAA but that the court found no conflict 
with the FAA because Section 7 NLRA rights are substantive and may not be individually 
and prospectively waived, and the FAA savings clause harmonizes the two statutes where 
the agreement to arbitrate is illegal); Greene & O’Brien, supra note 5, at 128-30 (arguing 
that the courts should defer to the NLRB’s position on D. R. Horton cases). 
 215.  24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13082 (5th Cir. June 27, 2016) (per curiam) (granting employer’s motion for summary 
disposition and refusing to enforce NLRB’s order), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-689 (U.S. 
Nov. 23, 2016); Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at *1-2, *8-10 (Oct. 28, 
2014), enf. denied in relevant part, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied,
No. 14-608000 (5th Cir. May 13, 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-307, 2017 WL 125666 (U.S. 
Jan. 13, 2017)).  In its 24 Hour Fitness petition, the NLRB asked the court to hold the case 
pending its disposition of Murphy Oil and other related petitions and then apply the rule to 
the instant case.  Matthew Perlman, NLRB Asks High Court to Review Another Class Waiver 
Case, LAW360 (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/866238/nlrb-asks-high-
court-to-review-another-class-waiver-case [https://perma.cc/YPM3-CEP9]. 
 216.  Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 15-CV-82-BBC, 2015 WL 5330300, at *1 (W.D. 
Wis. Sept. 11, 2015), aff’d, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-285, 2017 
WL 125664 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017).  See Jon Steingart, Solo Arbitration Violates Right to 
Concerted Activity, 17 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 845, 862 (Aug. 26, 2016) (noting the 
circuit split on solo arbitration NLRB cases).  
 217.  Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., 659 F. App’x. 40 (2d Cir. 2016), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 16-388 (U.S. Sept. 22, 2016); Morris, 834 F.3d 975. 
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veritable avalanche of NLRB decisions on this issue over the past year that 
could be appealed, with over thirty of them pending before the the Fifth 
Circuit, which has been summarily reversing the Board on the class waiver 
issue based upon its ruling in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil.218
As the Supreme Court’s new term began, there were four relevant 
petitions for certiorari before the Court.219  Yet, there has been a wait for a 
grant of certiorari in these cases involving class action waivers in 
employment arbitration agreements, and it remains uncertain how the 
present or future Court will rule.220  The Court was understaffed after the 
death of Justice Scalia, but that is likely to change in 2017.  If President 
Obama’s nominee Chief Justice Merrick Garland of the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals had been confirmed, the NLRB would have had a well-
seasoned judge as the court’s ninth member who has shown an 
understanding of the NLRB’s role and been more than evenhanded in the 
 218.  See Suevon Lee, 5th  Circ. Reverses NLRB on Gym Chain Arbitration Pacts,
LAW360 (June 28, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/811834/5th-circ-reverses-nlrb-
on-gym-chain-arbitration-pacts [https://perma.cc/42TQ-MP58] (noting that the NLRB 
argued against summary reversal in 24 Hour Fitness case before the Fifth Circuit that “[t]he 
decision whether to seek Supreme Court review will affect not only Murphy Oil, but also 
approximately 70 board decisions like this one, including nearly 60 decisions pending in the 
various courts of appeals, of which over 30 are before this court”); Richard F. Griffin, Jr., 
Gen. Couns., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Keynote Speech at 43rd Annual Robert Fuchs 
Labor Law Conference (Nov. 3, 2016) (stating that, at the present time, there are sixty-nine 
such cases pending in the various federal courts of appeal with thirty-five pending before the 
Fifth Circuit). 
 219.  See Vin Gurrieri, High Court Term Ends Without Employment Blockbusters,
LAW360 (June 28, 2016) (noting that the Supreme Court’s term was thrown off by Justice 
Scalia’s death, leaving the Court shorthanded and unable to reach a consensus in numerous 
key employment cases).  As of the start of the new calendar year, Epic Systems, Ernst & 
Young, Murphy Oil, and Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., were all fully briefed and awaiting a 
determination on petitions for certiorari from the Supreme Court.  The Court conferenced on 
these cases January sixth and thirteenth, granted three of these four petitions on January 
thirteenth, and consolidated them for one hour of oral argument, leaving only Raymours
Furniture out. See Braden Campbell, Employment Cases to Watch in 2017, LAW360 (Jan. 
2, 2017) https://www.law360.com/articles/870209/employment-cases-to-watch-in-2017 
[https://perma.cc/ECR3-WBYQ]; Dubé, supra note 211 (outlining the petitions granted and 
noting that Epic Systems involved a private employment dispute rather than an unfair labor 
practice proceeding at the NLRB, such as in Murphy Oil).
 220.  The NLRB’s General Counsel noted that the first opportunity for the United States 
Supreme Court Justices to conference on the four pending petitions for certiorari concerning 
individual arbitration provisions with collective action waivers would be the first or second 
week of December 2016. See Griffin, Fuchs Keynote Speech 2016, supra note 218.  In fact, 
the conferences were eventually scheduled for January sixth and thirteenth, 2017. See Amy 
Howe, Court Adds 16 New Cases to Its Merits Docket, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 13, 2017, 3:10 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/court-adds-16-new-cases-merits-docket/ 
[https://perma.cc/NF6D-25YC] (discussing actions taken at Supreme Court private 
conferences, including granting review in sixteen new cases). 
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deference shown to the Board in his opinions.221  The present Court is 
somewhat more likely to see things the NLRB’s way on the class waiver 
issue than it would have when Justice Scalia was on the Court because of 
his pro-arbitration stance.222  If the Court considered these cases before a 
ninth justice was confirmed, it is possible that there could have been a tie 
vote on an eight-member court, thus leaving the lower court decisions as 
law, and failing to resolve the conflict among the circuits. 
If the Supreme Court does not agree with the NLRB’s rulings in D. R. 
Horton, Murphy Oil, and On Assignment, perhaps the NLRB’s next best 
chance of protecting collective action might lie in the passage of The 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015 (AFA).223  In addition to antitrust and civil 
rights actions, the AFA exempts consumer and employment disputes from 
mandatory arbitration, where the arbitration is not “truly voluntary” and is 
agreed to prior to the occurrence of a dispute.224  The bill notes the 
problems with arbitration include the lack of transparency and inadequate 
judicial review.225  The AFA does not ban arbitration but it targets 
agreements that sign away an employee’s right to protest prior to the 
existence of a dispute. The proposed bill includes areas that are protected 
by statute beyond employment, such as consumer, antitrust and civil rights, 
directly addressing areas where the Supreme Court has ruled that the FAA 
mandates enforcement of arbitration provisions that bar collective or class 
action.
It seems that the AFA is not all that likely to be enacted, as its 
progress has stalled out in prior efforts; the last noted action on the bill was 
when it was reintroduced in late March of 2017, and its potential for 
passage is certainly not increased by the bill’s support of the right to sue in 
court on all statutory claims even if there is a collective bargaining 
 221.  See Hannah Belitz, The Supreme Court Vacancy and Labor: Merrick Garland,
ONLABOR (Feb. 23, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/02/23/the-supreme-court-vacancy-and-
labor-merrick-garland-2/ [https://perma.cc/MA56-TF9A] (noting Justice Garland’s 
deference to agencies and labor). 
 222.  See Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed 
Understanding of Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 111-15 (2015) 
(arguing that Justice Scalia’s 2013 Italian Colors opinion signified that the vindicating 
rights doctrine did not void an arbitration agreement with a class action waiver even though 
an individual suit was not affordable). 
 223.  H.R. 2087, 114th Congress (1st Sess. 2015) (reintroducing a bill to amend Title 9 
of the U.S. Code with respect to arbitration).  The Arbitration Fairness Act was reintroduced 
in the Senate on March 7, 2017 by Senator Al Franken, and the legislative tracking service 
predicts a 3% chance of passage and the similar House Report bill is predicted to have a 2% 
chance of passage. S. 537: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s537 [https://perma.cc/A436-E4R3]. 
 224.  H.R. 2087 at 2-3, 5. 
 225.  Id.
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agreement with a dispute resolution process that ends in arbitration to 
encompass such claims.226  This provision seems unnecessarily protective 
of employee rights to sue in court rather than in arbitration, at least with 
respect to the requirements of the NLRA, because when a majority 
representative acts for the group and negotiates a contract, there is 
collective action present and the inclusion of statutory claims has been 
agreed to in the process of negotiating the best terms for the entire 
bargaining unit.  Preventing a union from including statutory claims in the 
arbitration process goes well beyond what the NLRA requires and could 
result in the bill losing support from unions, making it less likely that the 
proposed act will pass. 
CONCLUSION
Employment is a basic need for most individuals, and low-level 
workers in particular have little or no bargaining power when confronted 
with a contract of employment that requires individual arbitration as the 
exclusive means of settling future disputes.  The class action waiver 
provision that accompanies such agreements ensures that most employees 
will never pursue their legal rights because it is just too expensive for an 
individual to do so in arbitration.  In contrast, the availability of class or 
collective action often provides access to a lawyer who would be 
compensated on a contingency fee basis.  Cutting off this avenue and 
substituting individual arbitration, where the individual employee must pay 
and perhaps pay for the employer’s costs as well if he/she loses, makes the 
dispute resolution mechanism all but illusory.  When prospective 
employees are forced to agree to a mandatory dispute resolution program 
with a collective action waiver, they are signing away rights they do not 
know they need long before they may need them.  Arbitration is an 
excellent method for resolving disputes as long as it places the parties into 
a fair and neutral forum and both sides have an equivalent shot at justice.  
However, when arbitration is used as a sword by businesses to prevent 
individual employees from protesting violations of their federal and state 
statutory rights regarding employment conditions; when corporations write 
the rules and hire the judges, and employees are locked out of collective 
action by contract provisions that require them to sign away their rights if 
they want the job, the basic premise behind federal labor law is 
undermined, and employees are locked out of an equitable process. 
The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act addresses the problem of 
 226.  See id. at 2-6 (advocating that the FAA was not intended to encompass employee 
and consumer disputes, which are not justly adjudicated through arbitration in some 
circumstances).
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mandatory pre-dispute arbitration as a one-sided agreement where the deck 
is stacked and dealt by the employer and most employees simply cannot 
afford the ante in order to play the individual arbitration game.  However, 
passage of the AFA seems a long shot at best.  Thus, federal courts need to 
enforce the labor law as it was written, to protect concerted activity for 
organizational purposes and mutual aid or protection among employees, 
including collective action with respect to workplace disputes.  Allowing 
employers to mandate individual arbitration and ban collective action is no 
better than the so-called ‘yellow dog’ contracts employers required 
employees to sign swearing that they would not join a union, thus waiving 
their federal statutory right to organize under the NLRA.  Yellow dog 
contracts violated the NLRA and the courts upheld the NLRB when it 
found such contracts illegal.  The NLRB ruled that mandatory individual 
arbitration provisions with collective action waivers violate the NLRA, and 
it is correct in its interpretation of the statute as well as its duty to interpret 
the Act in light of changing industrial trends. 
The Seventh Circuit upheld the NLRB’s position in Lewis and the 
Ninth Circuit followed the same ruling in Morris.  As the majority stated in 
Morris, “[a]t its heart, this is a labor law case, not an arbitration case.”227
The FAA does not need to nor should it override the NLRA, as there is no 
conflict between the two statutes.  The illegality of arbitration provisions 
that restrict concerted legal claims, a core substantive right under the 
NLRA, means that the savings clause in the FAA prevents the enforcement 
of such provisions.  It is time for all the federal courts to uphold the Board 
on this issue.  It is possible that the current pending cases—Lewis, Morris,
and Murphy Oil—will provide the Supreme Court with the opportunity to 
make the NLRB’s D. R. Horton rule the law of the land.  The question 
presented by the NLRB in the Murphy Oil case is framed to enlist the 
Court’s support for the proposition that the illegality of class waivers under 
the NLRA triggers the FAA’s savings clause.  The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce would prefer to see the more broadly framed questions 
presented by Lewis and Morris decide the matter.228  With upwards of 
seventy percent of employers in the United States using mandatory 
arbitration provisions,229 the legality of these contract clauses is of 
tremendous importance to employees’ individual and collective rights.  It is 
 227.  Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 989 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted,
No. 16-300, 2017 WL 125665 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017). 
 228.  See Matthew Bultman, Biz Group Urges High Court To Hear 2 Class Waiver 
Cases, LAW360 (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/851837/biz-group-urges-
high-court-to-hear-2-class-waiver-cases [https://perma.cc/7CQL-TC47] (discussing the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce’s lobbying of the Supreme Court in class waiver cases). 
 229.  See Griffin, Fuchs Keynote Speech 2016, supra note 218 (estimating the 
prevalence of mandatory arbitration provisions in the private sector). 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 21 S
ide A
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 21 Side A      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
1_O'BRIEN_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:30 PM
2017] WILL THE SUPREME COURT AGREE WITH THE NLRB? 551 
important to note that contract law does not preempt the NLRA, a federal 
statute.  As the Supreme Court has previously noted, it is the role of the 
NLRB to interpret the NLRA in light of changing industrial patterns.230
Mandatory individual arbitration provisions represent such a trend and such 
provisions clearly fly in the face of the substantive right that guarantees 
employees: “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,” as well as “the 
right to refrain from any or all such activities.”231  In addition, the NLRA 
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 
Section 157.”232  Employers that mandate individual arbitration and prevent 
access to group action for dispute resolution, or collective bargaining 
regarding wages or other working conditions, are blocking concerted 
activities and collective bargaining in direct violation of the clear language 
of the statute.  The Federal Arbitration Act does not conflict with the 
NLRA on this issue, because the FAA’s savings clause prevents the 
conflict.  The Court should uphold the substantive right to collective action 
in employment that is embodied in the clear language of the NLRA, as it 
has in the past. 
 230.  Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975). 
 231.  29 U.S.C. §157 (1947). 
 232.  29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) (1974). 
